Botnets have evolved to become one of the most serious threats to the Internet and there is substantial research on both botnets and botnet detection techniques. This survey reviewed the history of botnets and botnet detection techniques. The survey showed traditional botnet detection techniques rely on passive techniques, primarily honeypots, and that honeypots are not effective at detecting peer-to-peer and other decentralized botnets. Furthermore, the detection techniques aimed at decentralized and peer-to-peer botnets focus on detecting communications between the infected bots. Recent research has shown hierarchical clustering of flow data and machine learning are effective techniques for detecting botnet peer-to-peer traffic.
INTRODUCTION
The term 'botnet' is now associated with cybercrime and hacking (Alhomoud, Awan, Disso, & Younas, 2013) . However, botnets were originally developed to assist with the administration of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) Servers (Cooke et al., 2005) . As the popularity of IRC expanded, the IRC server administrators developed software to perform automated functions to assist with the administration of the IRC Servers (Cooke et al., 2005) . The computers that operated the software and performed the automated functions were referred to as robot computers and eventually as bots (Dittrich, 2012) . The Eggdrop IRC bot was the first IRC Bot, developed in 1993 by Jeff Fisher to assist with the administration of IRC channels and which is still in use today (Alhomoud et al., 2013; Cooke et al., 2005) . Eventually, a network of bots was developed under the direction of IRC administrators and became known as a botnet (Dittrich, 2012) . IRC administrators were able to send a single command from their computer and the botnet would execute that command on all the IRC Servers. Figure 1 shows a typical network configuration of an IRC botnet. Nefarious individuals realized the potential of botnets for unethical purposes and the botnets began to infect IRC users' computers without the users' knowledge and use those computers without the users' consent (Cao & Qiu, 2013; Cooke et al, 2005) .
A Computer Emergency Response Team, Coordination Center (CERT/CC) advisory published on March 11, 2003, CERT/CC Advisory CA-2003-08, warned against the GTbot and sdbot utilizing IRC to remotely control compromised systems (Householder & Danyliw, 2003) . Householder and Danyliw (2003) also highlighted the growing size of botnets, with reports of GT-bot botnets in excess of 140,000 bots and the sdbot with over 7000 compromised systems. Householder and Danyliw also warned of the botnets' ability to launch distributed denial of service attacks with TDP, UDP, and ICMP packets. The size and scope of botnets continued to rise at an alarming rate and in February 2010, Spanish authorities and the FBI dismantled the Mariposa botnet, which consisted of over 12 million compromised computers (Roscini, 2014) . Only 2 years after the takedown of the Mariposa botnet, another botnet, the Metulji botnet, was dismantled by the FBI and consisted of over 20 million compromised computers (Ventre, 2013) . In 2013, Rossow and Dietrich considered botnets to be one of the Internet's most serious threats and Awan et al. (2013) believed botnets are a priority for many countries' cyber defenses.
There has been considerable research into botnets and botnet detection techniques, but botnets are constantly evolving to stay ahead of the latest detection techniques (Brezo, Santos, Bringas, & Val, 2011; Feily, Shahrestani, & Ramadass, 2009; Hasan, Awadi, & Belaton, 2013; Zeng, 2012; Zhang, 2012) . This survey analyzed the history and evolution of botnet detection as botnets changed from a centralized command and control structure to a decentralized peer-topeer control structure. When early research on botnet detection focused on the use of passive honeypots and detection techniques aimed at detecting botnet command and control communications in centralized botnets, Botmasters began to use peer-to-peer and decentralized communications (Feily et al., 2009; Hasan, Awadi, & Belaton, 2013; Zeng, 2012; Zhang, 2012) . Botnet detection techniques were then developed to identify communications between infected computers within the decentralized botnets and Botmasters responded with the use of obfuscated and encrypted communications (Brezo, Santos, Bringas, & Val, 2011; Feily et al., 2009; Gu, Porras, Yegneswaran, Fong, & Lee, 2007; Zeng, 2012; Zhang, 2012) .
There have been several previous surveys of botnet detection techniques, but most are dated prior to 2009 and do not include botnet detection techniques aimed at decentralized or encrypted botnets (Feily et al., 2009; Bailey, Cooke, Jahanian, Yunjing, & Karir, 2009; Zhu, Lu, Chen, Fu, Roberts, & Han, 2008 DETECTION (2005 DETECTION ( -2010 The Honeynet project was a pioneer in botnet detection (Feily et al., 2009) . The Honeynet project began in 1999 as an information mailing list for information security professionals and was established as a nonprofit information security research organization with the mission to learn about computer and network attacks in 2000 (Spitzner, 2003) . Spitzner (2003) defined a honeynet as a network of computers placed on the Internet with the intention of capturing unauthorized activity directed at the computers. The purpose of a honeynet is to monitor network activity after malicious software is installed on the honeynet's computers and learn how the malicious software operates, with the goal of capturing new and unknown attacks and malicious software (Spitzner, 2003) . In a 2009 survey of botnet detection techniques, Feily et al. (2009) found a vast majority of the botnet detection techniques rely heavily on honeynets because honeynets are simple to operate and are passive to the botnet, so no interaction is required with the botmaster or command and control server by the researcher. The honeynet receives the instructions or commands from the botnet operator but does not itself respond or execute the commands (Spitzner, 2003 (Cooke et al., 2005) .
EARLY BOTNET
Although Cooke et al. (2005) determined monitoring for command and control traffic was not effective, Gu et al. (2007) develop BotHunter, to detect inbound command and control traffic with bots inside a local area network. Gu et al. developed two plugins and one ruleset for the open source, intrusion detection system, Snort (Cisco, 2014) . For inbound traffic detection, Gu et al. (2007) developed the Snort plugin, Statistical Scan Anomaly Detection (SCADE) which monitors 24 TCP and 4 UDP inbound ports for possible command and control traffic associated with botnet malware. SCADE also monitors outbound traffic for hosts that scan a large number of external IP addresses or have high number of failed external connections.
The second Snort (Cisco, 2014) plugin developed by Gu et al. (2007) Statistical Payload Anomaly Detection Engine (SLADE) attempts to detect malicious payloads through packet inspection of all inbound traffic. SLADE utilizes anomaly detection to determine if payloads are suspicious based on the payloads standard deviation from test payloads of normal Internet traffic (Gu et al., 2007) . The problem with deep packet inspection is the large overhead associated with inspecting voluminous amounts of traffic in large networks (Zhang, 2012) . Gu et al. (2007) also developed four rulesets for Snort (Cisco, 2014) to monitor 1383 heuristics of known botnets and malware. BotHunter's final phase of detection is a correlation matrix that weighs each Snort alert and applies a coefficient based on the type of alert to determine if a host is infected (Gu et al., 2007) . Gu, Zhang, and Lee (2008) built upon BotHunter to develop BotSniffer, a system designed to detect botnet command and control traffic through anomaly detection. BotSniffer is limited to detecting IRC and HTTP botnets that use a centralized command and control server, but no prior knowledge of a botnet's signature is required to detect hosts within a local area network (Gu, Zhang, et al., 2008) . In both IRC and HTTP botnets, Gu, Zhang, et al. recognized that the bots must make connections to the command and control server to obtain commands and then the bots will have similar activity based on the commands. Based on research conducted by Zhuge, Holz, Han, Guo, & Zou (2007) , Gu and his associates developed BotSniffer to recognize similar behavior by hosts after communicating with a possible command and control server located at the same IP address. Zhuge et al. (2007) had determined that over 28% IRC botnet commands are for spreading malware and 25% of IRC commands are for distributed denial of service attacks. Based on these statistics, Gu, Zhang et al. (2008) developed anomaly based algorithms to detect command and control traffic, as well as network scanning, with the open source intrusion detection system, Snort (Cisco, 2014) . Utilizing previously captured network traffic with known botnet infections, Gu, Zhang et al. (2008) successfully tested BotSniffer and detected 100% of IRC botnet command and control traffic with a false positive rate of 0.16%.
Research by Karasaridis, Rexford, and Hoeflin (2007) in anomaly-based detection techniques demonstrated the ability to calculate the size of botnets as well as identify command and control servers by analyzing flow data from the transport layer in largescale networks. However, this technique was only tested against IRC based botnets utilizing a centralized command and control server (Karasaridis et al., 2007) . Karasaridis et al. recommended additional research in the detection of peer-to-peer and HTTP based botnets.
With the introduction of botnets communicating via peer to peer networks, Gu, Perdisci et al. (2008) developed BotMiner as a botnet detection technique that is effective against any botnet command and control protocol or structure, including peer to peer. Figure 2 shows a typical peer to peer botnet infrastructure without a central command and control server. BotMiner detects botnets by clustering hosts based on similar traffic and malicious activities (Gu, Perdisci et al., 2008) . Gu, Perdisci et al.' s research focused on the botnet communications since botnets much communicate with a command and control server of with other bots to receive commands such as when to scan or launch attacks. In order for the bots to function as a botnet, the bots must receive the same commands; therefore the researchers believed the same botnet would have similar traffic and malicious activities (Gu, Perdisci et al., 2008) . Based on the similar traffic and activities, BotMiner clusters similar communication traffic into Cplane traffic and like malicious activities into A-plane traffic (Gu, Perdisci et al., 2008) . Gu, Perdisci et al. then detected botnets by correlating the A-plane and C-plane traffic.
To cluster communications within the Cplane traffic, Gu, Perdisci, et al. (2008) monitored TCP and UDP network flow data and recorded IP addresses, network ports time and duration of the traffic, and the number of packets and bytes transferred in each direction. Gu, Perdisci et al. used Snort (Cisco, 2014) to capture A-plane traffic based on malicious activities, scanning, spam, and binary downloads. The C-plane clusters were then correlated with the A-plane clusters to identify hosts that are part of a botnet (Gu, Perdisci et al., 2008) . Experimental results showed the technique to be effective for detecting command and control traffic of four different botnet types. However, the technique is only effective against botnets with a centralized command and control structure (Wang & Yu, 2009 (Hadoop, 2013) , an open source form of distributed computing based on Google's MapReduce (Dean & Ghemawat, 2004) to develop BotCloud to efficiently analyze NetFlow data. BotCloud showed improved detection rates when prior information about botnets is developed with a honeypot (Francois et al., 2011) . Furthermore, BotCloud's use of Hadoop (2013) increased the efficiency and speed of botnet detection (Francois et al., 2011).
Zhang, Perdisci, Lee, Sarfraz and Luo (2011) developed a botnet detection technique to detect botnet peer-to-peer communications utilizing statistical fingerprints of peer-to-peer traffic. Peer-to-peer botnets have an advantage over IRC or HTTP protocol botnets because the former do not have a centralized command and control server and single point of failure (Zhang et al., 2011) . The lack of a centralized command and control server make peer-to-peer botnets more resilient and more difficult to disable (Zhang et al., 2011) After filtering the peer-to-peer traffic based on length of active peer-to-peer traffic Zhang et al. (2011) further differentiated the traffic based on IP addresses contacted by peer-topeer hosts. Since peer-to-peer botnet hosts within the same LAN/WAN will often communicate with the same IP addresses and with other bots within the LAN/WAN, the researchers were able to filter out peer-to-peer hosts that did not communicate with any IP addresses that were not contacted by other peer-to-peer hosts (Zhang et al., 2011) . The final filter Zhang et al. applied was based on the connection status of the traffic. If a peerto-peer host had completed an outgoing three way handshake on a TCP connection or a UDP connection with a request and response packet, the traffic is kept and all other traffic is filtered out (Zhang et al., 2011) . Zhang et al. based this filter on their findings that peer-topeer nodes function as both a server and a client, and must accept connections from other hosts in the network and initiate connections with the same hosts. After this traffic filtering was complete, Zhang et al. attempted to identify peer-to-peer botnet hosts.
Zhang et al.'s final action to identify peerto-peer botnet hosts involved differentiating between legitimate peer-to-peer traffic and botnet peer-to-peer traffic. To determine this, Zhang et al. analyzed the traffic for hosts that ran the same protocol and communicated with a high percentage of the same IP addresses. As stated earlier, bots of the same peer-to-peer botnet will communicate with each other and share IP destinations of other bots within the botnet. Furthermore, Zhang et al.'s research showed bots of the same botnet use the same peer-to-peer protocol. Based on these filters and detection techniques, Zhang et al. were able to detect 100% of the peer-to-peer bots within captured network traffic with only a 0.2% false positive rate.
As botnets began to use encrypted communications, Barthakur, Dahal and Ghose (2012) developed a procedure for detecting encrypted peer-to-peer botnet communications. Barthakur et al. used Support Vector Machines to analysis network traffic and classify botnet communications based on patterns and statistical differences between peer-to-peer botnet communications and normal web traffic. Barthakur et al. recognized botnet communications use many random ports and attempt to keep packet sizes to a minimum, which is the opposite of legitimate peer-to-peer to traffic. Based on these facts, Support Vector Machines were able to analyze patterns of peer-to-peer traffic and successfully identify botnet communications (Barhakur et al., 2012).
Han, Chen, Xu and Liang (2012) In response, Zhang (2012) developed a new botnet detection technique to identify drive by download attacks and detect botnets in the infection stage. Zhang recognized that many botnets use drive by downloads to infect new bots and by preventing the initial infection the size and scope of botnets could be greatly diminished. To identify drive by download techniques, Zhang collected HTTP traces from honeypots and whenever exploits were detected, the honeypots used a dynamic WebCrawler to record the URLs and IP addresses of the domains. Zhang then clustered groups of hostnames that share IP addresses. By clustering the hostnames based on shared IP addresses, Zhang was able to defeat the botnets that use fast flux network changes to command control server domain names and IP addresses. Fast flux networks use numerous IP addresses for one domain name and repeatedly update the DNS records for the domain name to different IP addresses to avoid detection (Caglayan, Toothaker, Drapaeau, & Burke, 2010) . Furthermore, Zhang (2012) also developed a system to increase the scalability of botnet detection systems. Zhang's system improved upon current detection systems by reducing the amount of packets requiring deep packet inspection; Zhang accomplished this by developing a three-step process that captures network flows, correlated the network flows and detected botnets through fine grain analysis. Rather than use deep packet inspection, Zhang's system used network flow information and packet header information, which allowed for deployments in larger networks and the ability to inspect traffic for botnet command and control traffic. Zhang (2012) also developed a flow-capture process that monitors the edge of large networks and gathers netflow data on possible botnet traffic. The netflow data is then assembled and passed to the flow-correlation module. Zhang used a process developed in BotMiner called C-flow (Gu et al., 2008) to build the flow-correlation module. However, Zhang used a more efficient process for clustering netflows to allow for larger traffic volumes and employed correlation to identify hosts that had similar persistent communications. In Zhang's final process, a fine-grained detector utilizes previous detection techniques based on deep packet inspection. Zhang used both BotMiner and BotSniffer to inspect the traffic identified as possible botnet traffic by the flow-capture and flow-correlation modules and was able to achieve 100% detection rate when using cross correlation of flows and the B-sampling algorithm. For sampling rates above 0.05%, Zhang obtained false positive rates between 0.3% and 8%, as the sampling rate increased. However, when Zhang used both flow-correlation and a finegrain detector, Zhang was able to detect 100% of botnets with no false positives for sampling rates above 0.05%. Ilavarasan and Muthumanickam (2012) combined host level detection and network level analysis to overcome the limitations of each separately. The host level detection utilized registry analysis and file monitoring to detect changes related malware associated with botnets (Ilavarasan & Muthumanickam, 2012) . Ilavarasan and Muthumanickam analyzed network traffic to identify peer-to-peer traffic and cluster similar traffic based on activity and contacted IP addresses. The final process in Ilavarasan's and Muthumanickam's detection technique was a correlation engine that combined the network analysis with the host level detection to alert for possible botnet infections.
Zeng (2012) developed a three-pronged approach to identify and mitigate the effects of botnets. Zeng proposed utilizing end host containment of infected bots, network edge detection of botnets, and measuring of network components at the infrastructure level for large botnet detection. Zeng also presented a proof of concept for future botnets utilizing mobile smart phones and SMS messages for command and control of a botnet. Zeng discussed the history of botnets and botnet detection techniques and highlighted the limitations of the current strategies to detect botnets. Most notably, the researcher discussed the rapidly changing communication methods for botnets, including peer-to-peer communications, and the limitations of current HTTP and IRC detection techniques (Zeng, 2012) . Zeng's (2012) research on end-host botnet detection incorporated previous techniques for containment of fast spreading network worms with new behavior analysis of all applications on the computer. The behavior analysis examined the actions of applications at the registry, file system and network stack, and was successful at identifying suspicious actions, while allowing legitimate applications (Zeng, 2012) . Furthermore, the rate of false positives was greatly reduced when compared to existing detection techniques (Zeng, 2012) Zeng (2012) also combined the edge network detection technique with the hostbased detection to increase the effectiveness of botnet detection. The edge network detection utilizes NetFlow data captured from routers and does not access the packet payload, ensuring privacy for legitimate traffic (Zeng, 2012) . Zeng identified 17 traits of botnets that he used to determine if network traffic was suspicious and related to botnets. The 17 traits identified by Zeng for botnet traffic include the following network flow features: mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis for duration; mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis for total bytes; mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis for number of packets; and the number of TCP flows, UDP flows, SMTP flows, unique IPs contacted, and number of suspicious ports.
The final portion of Zeng's (2012) technique was botnet detection at the infrastructure level. Zeng chose to focus on large peer-to-peer botnets and evaluate the feasibility of detecting peer-to-peer botnets at the Internet infrastructure level. Zeng concluded that host-based techniques for botnet detection are not reliable and network edge detection is necessary to detect botnets. Furthermore, the behavior analysis and NetFlow analysis Zeng developed is independent of the type of botnet and command and control communication a botnet utilizes, thus it greatly increases the chances of botnet detection. Bilge, Balzarotti, Robertson, Kirda, and Kruegel (2012) developed Disclosure, a botnet detection system to detect command and control servers, rather than individual bots. Using Netflow data, Disclosure distinguishes between botnet command and control server traffic, and benign server traffic through the flow size between a server and client. Bilge et al. stated command and control server traffic does not fluctuate significantly due to the limited number of commands used by the botnet. Furthermore, the objective of the botnet is to stay undetected, so the botnet sends the shortest flow of data possible. Similar to anomaly based IDS, Disclosure performed better when larger amounts of benign flow data were analyzed. This enabled Disclosure to distinguish between benign server traffic and command and control server traffic (Bilge et al., 2012) . During evaluation, Bilge et al. tried numerous settings within Disclosure and the results showed as the detection rate increased, so did the false positive rate.
Using the different behaviors of botnets, Li, Xie, Luo and Zhu (2013) developed Snort rules to detect botnet activity. Specifically, Li, Xie, et al. determined there were six behaviors unique to botnets: abnormal access to backup DNS servers, large number of domain name requests to a single domain, accessing fast flux networks, downloading malware, ingress and egress scanning, and null TCP connections. Based on these behaviors, Li, Xie et al. developed Snort rules to detect each behavior. Every Snort alert was tracked in an alert matrix and correlated against the six known botnet behaviors to identify botnet activity (Li, Xie et al., 2013) . Li, Xie et al. were successful at identifying 20 known botnets with detection rates between 74% and 94% with no false positives. Lie et al. also test the Snort (Cisco, 2014) rules against 8 unknown botnets and detected between 56% and 73% of unknown botnets with zero false positives. Lie, Xie et al. explain unknown botnets as botnets that the malicious behavior of the botnet is unknown, not the actual malware. Rossow and Dietrich (2013) recognized that existing intrusion detection systems are not capable of detecting all encrypted command and control traffic based on payload signatures. The payload-based signatures used by intrusion detection systems are easily defeated by encrypted or obfuscated command and control traffic because botnets employ defense measures against payload signature recognition, such as dynamic encryption keys, data payloads encrypted with the XOR cipher, and varying the length of messages (Rossow & Dietrich, 2013) . To counter the defenses employed by botnets, Rossow and Dietrich developed Provex, a Network Intrusion Detection system (NIDS), which detects encrypted botnet communications and was designed to learn from previously decrypted botnet communications and identify characteristic bytes within encrypted traffic. Then Provex "derives probabilistic vectorized signatures that can be used to verify if decrypted packets stem from a certain malware family's C&C" (Rossow & Dietrich, 2013, p. 6) . Although Provex must decrypt network traffic and match signatures to the decrypted packets, Rossow and Dietrich were able to operate Provex at nearly 1Gbit/s of network traffic without packet loss and believed that Provex would handle network speeds of up to 10Gbit/s. In laboratory testing, Provex detected all true positive encrypted communications 100% of the time for six botnet variants and 78%, 81.5%, 87%, and 97% for four botnets, with only three false positive results (Rossow & Dietrich, 2013) .
Using 1317 distinct malware samples from 8 malware families that communicate via P2P, Kheir and Wolley (2013) 
COMPARISON OF BOTNET DETECTION TECHNIQUES BY INFRASTRUCTURE
This section provides a comparison of botnet detection techniques. We have compared the techniques based on the techniques ability to detect IRC, HTTP, and P2P based botnets and whether the technique is effective against encrypted botnet communications. Table 2 provides a summary of the different techniques detection ability. Previous botnet detection techniques have reported varied success rates for botnet detection and rates of false positive detections. In 2007 and 2008 true positive detection rates ranged between 95% and 96.8%, while false positive detection rates were between 0.049% and 0.0003%. (Gu et al., 2007; Gu, Perdisci, et al., 2008) . Between 2009 and 2014 true positive detection rates increased to between 99% and 100%, however false positive detection rates also increased to a range of 0.0056% and 0.2% (Barthakur et al., 2012; Francois et al., 2011; Haddadi et al., 2014; Wang and Yu, 2009; Zeng et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2011 , Zhang et al., 2014 . This survey showed that while true positive detection rates have increased, so have false positive detection rates. The one exception to these results are from Haddadi et al. (2014) , were the true positive detection rates decreased. Table 3 shows the true detection rates and false positive detection rates for nine studies reviewed as part of this survey that provided detection rates. Note: Gu, Perdisci et al. (2008) true detection rate is an average of 8 tests An analysis of the botnet detection techniques reviewed in the survey showed that techniques which used machine learning and hierarchical clustering of flow data were more effective than techniques based on deep packet analysis or fingerprint analysis. The same was true for the efficiency and scalability of the techniques. Relying solely on Netflow data allows the techniques to process large data sets, while maintaining high true positive detection rates and low false positive rates.
CONCLUSION
This survey examined the existing research on botnet detection and distributed denial of service attacks in a chronological order. Literature was reviewed from numerous sources including scholarly journals, conference papers, books, dissertations, and government documents. The literature was obtained from numerous online databases including, ProQuest, IEEE Computer Society Digital Library, ACM Digital Library, Google Scholar, and the IEEE Xplore Digital Library. The keywords used in the search included botnet, distributed denial of service, malware, denial of service, botnet detection, botnet identification, and proactive botnet. The review showed that botnets and botnet detection techniques are constantly evolving as Botmasters update and modify botnets to stay ahead of the latest botnet detection techniques (Alhomoud et al., 2013; Garant & Lu, 2013; Zargar, Joshi, & Tipper, 2013) . Although IRC and HTTP botnets are still active, most new botnets use a decentralized infrastructure to avoid a single point of failure (Garant & Lu, 2013; Gu et al., 2009 ). Furthermore, a majority of botnets now utilize encrypted communications to avoid detection (Garant & Lu, 2013; Gu et al., 2009; Li, Xie et al., 2013; Rossow & Dietrich, 2013) . Therefore, modern botnet detection techniques attempt to detect botnet command and control communications within network traffic through hierarchical clustering of flow data (Haddadi et al., 2014; Kheir & Wolley, 2013; Zhang et al., 2014) .
